Outcomes of the UOC Synod: another year of confession
The outcomes of the last session of the UOC Holy Synod in 2023 cannot be called significant or momentous. However, one very important decision can be discerned behind them.
On 26 December 2023, the last session of the Holy Synod of the UOC took place at the Panteleimon Monastery in Feofania. As a rule, such meetings are reporting where the results of the past year are summarised, various figures are announced, and decisions on current church issues are made. The current session was no exception, but it took place in a very challenging time and under difficult circumstances. This means that behind seemingly insignificant decisions, there may be conceptual moments.
The appointment of abbots and the approval of liturgical texts
The UOC Synod appointed the abbot of the Panteleimon Monastery in Odesa and dismissed the abbess of Iberian Icon of the Mother of God Convent in the Yuzefin Tract in the village of Hlynne, Rivne region. The Holy Synod also approved for liturgical use the text of the service in honour of the "Volodymyr-Tithe" (“Volodymyrska-Desiatynna”) Icon of the Mother of God, located in the Church of the Nativity of the Mother of God in the Tithe Monastery, Kyiv.
What could be more prosaic than the appointment of abbots in monasteries and the approval of liturgical texts? However, in current times, this news is evidence that monasteries are alive, that monastic life continues, and that no persecution can stop it. News about monastic tonsures is from this category.
For example, on the same day, December 26, 2023, news from the Rivne Eparchy: at the hermitage of St. Righteous Anna in the village of Onyshkivtsi, the tonsure into the great schema of a nun from the convent, Sister Daniilа, took place. Monastic tonsures have become more frequent lately. For instance, a few days before the Synod, two KDA students took monastic vows. This means that in the face of persecution, more and more people are choosing the path of confession, the path of serving the Church in monastic life. Today, this path no longer signifies a peaceful and quiet life in well-arranged monastic communities.
Today these newly tonsured monks and nuns realise that tomorrow they may be expelled from the monasteries, and the monasteries themselves can be turned, as in Soviet times, into museums or given to the OCU.
Today, for belonging to the UOC, and even more so for serving as a monk or priest, one can forfeit not only one's financial situation but also one's health and even personal freedom. But despite all this, people choose this path. The Church lives on and makes its way to the Heavenly Kingdom.
In the case of the "Volodymyr-Tithe" Icon of the Mother of God, the decision of the Synod is even more revealing because the authorities decided to demolish the Tithe Monastery where it is located. But the monastery will live on. It is not yet known how, it is not yet known where, but services in front of the icon will be held, and this is very important.
Sad statistics
Metropolitan Anthony, the UOC Chancellor, voiced the figures of losses of the UOC among the clergy and churches for the whole period of the war:
- deceased – 14 clerics;
- wounded – 20;
- missing – 5;
- destroyed – 119 churches and prayer rooms;
- partially destroyed or damaged from shelling – 329 churches;
- destroyed or significantly damaged – 30 monasteries.
Compared to the previous year, these figures are increasing. In 2022, in the UOC, 7 clerics died, 75 churches and 8 monasteries were destroyed. These numbers indicate that among all Ukrainian denominations, the UOC is the most affected by Russian aggression. Neither the OCU nor the Greek Catholics, nor other religious organisations come close to suffering such terrible losses from the war. Despite this, the state continues to label the UOC as a "pro-Russian" organisation that should be banned at the legislative level. The most distressing thing is that the state has managed to convince a significant part of Ukrainian society of this. Many Ukrainian citizens, influenced by propaganda, genuinely consider the UOC as an enemy without bothering with a basic analysis of the relevant arguments. Such an analysis is not difficult to conduct, just honestly answering a few simple questions.
- Which denomination has suffered the most from Russian aggression? UOC.
- Which denomination declared support for Ukraine and its sovereignty and blessed its faithful to defend the country in the first hours of the war? UOC.
- Which denomination provided the most material assistance to the Armed Forces, territorial defence and refugees? UOC.
- Are UOC believers serving in the Armed Forces? Yes, in large numbers.
- Are UOC believers dying on the front lines? Unfortunately, yes, and not just parishioners but also the sons and relatives of priests and even bishops.
All of this indicates that the UOC is undeniably the most patriotic religious organisation. But are there arguments suggesting otherwise? Yes, there are. For instance, the Security Service of Ukraine reports 61 criminal cases against UOC clerics on charges of state treason. But does this mean that the UOC is not patriotic? Absolutely not. Just as over 600 criminal cases on the same charges against Ukrainian government officials do not indicate that these government bodies are Russian agents.
If there are no objective reasons to accuse the UOC of betrayal, why is it being persecuted and attempted to be banned? Explanations could be either a conscious destruction of the Church of Christ in Ukraine or a way to shift public discontent from state officials, who have proven their ineffectiveness and unprofessionalism, to a defenceless organisation that is accessible for reprisals.
Criminal cases against metropolitans
The UOC chancellor Metropolitan Anthony said," Legal proceedings against Metropolitans Jonathan of Tulchyn, Pavel of Vyshhorod, Feodosiy of Cherkasy and Longin of Bancheny caused a great resonance both in the Ukrainian and global communities." But most importantly, according to the position of the Holy Synod, "the grounds for bringing UOC hierarchs to criminal responsibility and the evidence justifying their accusations are questionable".
That is, the UOC considers these bishops innocent, and the criminal cases against them – fabricated. But the Holy Synod could simply have remained silent. In our opinion, this is the most important decision of the Synod, which shows the principled stance of the UOC in relations with the current authorities of Ukraine. The UOC is not going to bend and compromise, despite the unprecedented persecution against it.
But the Church has a historical experience of somewhat different behaviour. The policy of Metropolitan and then Patriarch Sergius (Stragorodsky), known as "Sergianism", involved making concessions to state power on various matters, including the criminal prosecution of clergy. Often, if a priest or hierarch was arrested by the authorities on clearly fabricated charges of treason, espionage, conspiracy and the like, the Church leadership removed such a clergyman from their position or even banned him. That is, the Church hierarchs sided with the persecutors. The proponents of this approach argued that only such a policy could save the Church from total destruction but history proved the inadequacy of this position.
Apparently, the UOC has learned from historical lessons, and its stance is firm and consistent: it does not "betray" its hierarchs, declares the baselessness of the accusations (which is true), and refuses to compromise with the authorities. What could these compromises be?
For instance, negotiations with the OCU regarding unity or the declaration of autocephaly, support of the authorities in transitioning to a new calendar, etc. One could firmly defend church dogmas that are unclear to the state and secular society, such as the dogma of the Church, and face persecution, or one could choose the path of compromise and conciliation. The UOC has chosen the first path. The fact that it defends the innocence of its bishops before the state is a confirmation of this position.
In the field of international politics, there is much talk about the dominance of a values-based policy over short-term gains, also known as realpolitik.
Applying this approach to the Ukrainian church situation, we can say that the UOC adheres to a values-based policy and rejects short-term gains that would promise it compromises with the authorities. To put it in the language of ecclesiological terms and concepts, the UOC stands for the preservation of the purity of Orthodoxy, for the traditional understanding of the nature of the Church, its original ecclesiological doctrine (the dogma of the Church). The cost of such confession is enduring present persecutions, misunderstanding from a significant part of Ukrainian society, disfavour in the eyes of those in power and a serious risk of imprisonment for many clergy and laity.
Conclusions
The Holy Synod is quite aware of the situation between the hammer and the anvil in which the UOC finds itself. On the one hand, it is being physically destroyed by Russia and there are numerous voices in the ROC calling the UOC a traitor and threatening it with reprisals. On the other hand, the Ukrainian authorities are trying to ban the UOC, accusing it of sympathising with the aggressor. Despite all this, the Church lives on and fulfils its salvific mission on earth, entrusting its fate to God and caring not for immediate gains but for keeping faithful to Christ and His commandments.
As 2023 is coming to an end, another year of the UOC’s confession in the face of numerous challenges. And all of us need to say from the bottom of our hearts: Glory to God for everything!
