On the fate of UOC dioceses in the annexed territories
The ROC stated that a special Office for the Near Abroad would manage UOC parishes in the annexed regions. What does this decision mean and what dangers does it lurk?
On September 30, 2022, documents were signed in the Kremlin on the annexation by Russia of the territories of Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine.
On the same day, two statements by representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church appeared, in which they hinted at similar actions in the church sphere. RIA reported that according to the Deputy Head of the DECR MP, Fr. Igor Yakimchuk, the UOC dioceses in the annexed territories will be handled by the Office of the Moscow Patriarchate for dioceses in neighboring countries. In turn, when asked by Interfax whether the “annexed” dioceses would remain with the UOC, the Adviser to Patriarch Kirill, Archpriest Nikolai Balashov, answered that only God knows this, and turned the conversation to another topic.
Balashov is an experienced church diplomat, who has worked as deputy head of the DECR MP for many years. It seems that if there were no plans for church "annexation", Fr. Nikolai would be the first to hasten to declare this, since peace and harmony among the Orthodox is one of the primary tasks of church authorities. However, let us return to the Office of the Russian Orthodox Church for the Near Abroad.
It was established at the very beginning of the war by the decision of the Holy Synod of March 24, 2022, and immediately raised many perplexed questions, the main of which is why this institution is needed altogether. After all, there are church structures in the countries close to the Russian Federation that fully cope with the duties of ensuring spiritual care for believers. Why there is a need for some kind of additional control remains unclear.
The following dioceses of the UOC are located (in whole or in part) on the Ukrainian territories annexed by the Russian Federation,: Kherson and Tauride, Zaporizhzhia, Berdiansk and Prymorsk, Novokakhovsk, Severodonets, Donetsk and Mariupol, Luhansk, Horlivka and Slavyansk, Rovenkivtsi.
Should the war change the borders of the Churches?
At the beginning of October, the front line in the Ukrainian-Russian war is very unstable – there is an active offensive of Ukrainian troops, during which more and more settlements are liberated. According to the Ukraine: Now telegram channel, in September 2022, the Armed Forces of Ukraine liberated about 10,608 km² of Ukrainian territory. A huge number of churches have been destroyed, most of the parishioners live in evacuation, and the life of parishes has come to a standstill. How expedient under such conditions is the administrative resubordination of communities in the occupied territories of the Moscow Patriarchate (the question of legality is slightly below)? Indeed, since 2014, when Crimea was annexed and the unrecognized Luhansk and Donetsk People's Republics were proclaimed, the status quo was respected: the Crimean dioceses, Donetsk and Luhansk were part of the UOC. Despite the presence of a line of demarcation, bishops and clergy could visit parishes on both sides.
The situation with Crimea is generally indicative: the referendum there took place in a relatively peaceful environment, and although it was not recognized by almost anyone except Russia itself, its results in fact determined the control of the Russian Federation over the peninsula. There was an impression that the Russian Federation had been in Crimea for a long time, with which many politicians both in the West and in Ukraine itself tacitly agreed. It would seem logical to withdraw the Crimean dioceses from the UOC and include them in the administrative structures of the ROC. However, this was not done for the whole 8 years.
To a lesser extent, this applies to the unrecognized LDNR. There was also an opportunity to transfer the parishes of the Luhansk and Donetsk dioceses in the uncontrolled territories to the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate. But that didn't happen either.
And now, amid active hostilities, the Crimean dioceses are being resubordinated to Patriarch Kirill. The decision of the Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church of June 7, 2022 states: “Arising from the need to maintain an effective canonical and administrative connection with the central church authorities for the successful church life routine in the eparchies within the purview of the aforementioned Bishops, to accept the Dzhankoy, Simferopol and Feodosia eparchies into the direct canonical and administrative subordination to Patriarch Kirill."
This decision was made just 10 days after the Council of the UOC in Feofania, at which diocesan bishops were given the right to independently make decisions on certain issues of diocesan life that fall within the competence of the Holy Synod or the Primate of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. Literally, this paragraph reads as follows: “For a period of martial law, when ties between the dioceses and the church’s leading center are complicated or absent, the Council considers it expedient to give diocesan bishops the right to independently make decisions on certain issues of diocesan life that fall within the competence of the Holy Synod or the Primate of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, and to subsequently, when it is possible again, inform the hierarchy."
Let us remind you once again that for 8 years after the annexation of Crimea, the eparchies of the peninsula were under the jurisdiction of the UOC, in Kyiv bishops were ordained for Crimea. No one has ever talked about some kind of pastoral need to resubordinate the Crimean dioceses to Moscow. And suddenly, during the war, such a need arose. How justified is it? And what about the canons?
Possible “transfer” of dioceses on annexed lands to the ROC: what do the canons say?
After the decisions of the Council of the UOC in Feofania on the "complete independence and autonomy of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church", Ukrainian bishops are no longer members of the governing bodies of the ROC and, in particular, the Holy Synod. This means that the opinion of the UOC was not requested and was not taken into account when deciding on the acceptance of the Crimean eparchies into subordination to the Moscow Patriarch. How canonical is this decision in this case?
Here different approaches are possible.
On the one hand, one can interpret the decision of the Council of the UOC in Feofania “to grant diocesan bishops the right to independently make decisions on certain issues of diocesan life” as permission to independently decide on their administrative subordination. On the other hand, the issue of changing jurisdiction hardly relates to diocesan matters.
Thirdly, the Charter of the UOC says that the creation of dioceses or the change of their borders occurs by the decision of the Holy Synod of the UOC, followed by approval by the Council of Bishops. By the way, absolutely the same thing is written on this issue in the Charter of the Russian Orthodox Church (Chapter X, paragraph 8). Therefore, even if we “forget” about the decision of the Council of the UOC in Feofania on independence, what was the basis for the Crimean dioceses to be “withdrawn” by the Russian Church remains quite vague, because the change of jurisdiction can hardly relate to the “issues of diocesan life”.
In the event the UOC is completely independent of the Russian Church, it is worth remembering Canon 17 of the Quinisext Ecumenical Council: “Inasmuch as Clergymen of various churches have abandoned their own churches, in which they were ordained, and have run over to other Bishops, and without the consent of their own Bishop have had themselves enrolled in the others’ churches, and as a result of this they came to be insubordinate, we decree that, beginning with the month of January of the last fourth induction, not a single one of all the clergymen, regardless of what rank he happens to be in, has permission, unless furnished by a written dimissory of his own Bishop, to be enrolled in a different church. For, whoever fails to abide by this rule hereafter, but, on the contrary, so far as lies in his power disgraces him who bestowed the ordination on him, let both him and the one who illogically accepted him be deposed from office.”
That is, this Canon is categorical in terms of the requirement that Ukrainian bishops give their consent to the transfer of clerics to the subordination of the Moscow Patriarchate. This is the case both with the Crimean dioceses and the alleged "withdrawal" of the dioceses of Donbas, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia.
However, many in the ROC share the opinion that the Moscow Patriarchate can generally disregard the opinion of the UOC, and this will be quite “canonical”. Here, for example, is a quote from the telegram channel of priest-blogger Alvian Tkhelidze: “I suspect that after the annexation of new regions to Russia, the ROC will withdraw the dioceses of these regions from the jurisdiction of the UOC and resubordinate them directly to Moscow. The dioceses of Crimea have already gone this way. I think that after the council in Feofania, at which the UOC entered a state of half-life of a half-split, Moscow has every canonical reason not to reckon with the opinion of the ecclesiastical Kyiv.”
The fact that the secular authorities of the Russian Federation, while taking away Ukrainian territories, do not take into account the opinion of the Ukrainian authorities is quite understandable – these are the rules of an aggressive war. But there are supposedly no wars within the Church, right? How justified are such public statements?
Is the Church separated from the State or not?
In addition to the issue of the conformity (or non-compliance) of the actions of the Moscow Patriarchate with the letter of the canonical rules, there is a political underlying reason for the possible (it has not yet been officially announced) resubordination of the dioceses in the annexed territories to the administrative structures of the Russian Orthodox Church.
It is easy to see that the haste with an attempt to join the Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions to the Russian Federation, which resulted in the holding of "referendums", is viewed by many as a pretext for similar actions by the Moscow Patriarchate. These “referendums” took place, to put it mildly, in highly controversial circumstances:
- there are active hostilities in the annexed territories, and the front line is constantly moving;
- only part of the territories of the regions is under the actual control of the troops of the Russian Federation;
- more than half of the population has left these territories;
- voting was conducted under the control of the military.
It is clear that the authorities of the Russian Federation need “victories” to justify the war unleashed in Ukraine, because they are trying to secure these territories by any means. But should the Church act in a similar way? Is She not of this world? Exactly, and according to the laws of this world, the Church in Russia (as well as Ukraine) is separated from the state.
In addition, there are purely practical issues. If the dioceses in the annexed territories are transferred to the Russian Orthodox Church, and the Ukrainian army liberates these lands, what then? Transfer back to the UOC? Will it turn out the issues of the church life of the community will be determined by where the front line is, the successes or failures of the troops? Will such a leapfrog contribute to the normalization of church life? Should the administrative subordination of church structures change simultaneously with a rather fleeting change in the military-political situation (which we are now witnessing)? And should it change basically?
How many times have we heard Russian bishops saying that a change in the political affiliation of certain territories should not directly entail a change in church boundaries and administrative subordination? This was said about Ukraine, Moldova, Montenegro, and other cases. Unfortunately, now we do not hear the same principled position regarding the nine "Russian" dioceses of the UOC. After all, the above-mentioned Adviser to the Patriarch, Fr. Nikolai Balashov, could quite clearly answer journalists that the boundaries of the Church are different from those of the State, and there can be no changes in them after the “referendums”.
The Ukrainian Orthodox Church has recently had to endure serious trials. In Ukraine, supporters of the OCU are persecuting us in every possible way, taking away churches and generally trying to exterminate us. The war unleashed by the Russian Federation is destroying our churches and monasteries. To make matters even worse, there may be another point of pressure. Let’s hope that the UOC will cope with these issues as it did before.
“Give careful thought to the paths for your feet and be steadfast in all your ways. Do not turn to the right or the left; keep your foot from evil” (Prov. 4:26-27).
