Viktor Yelensky: The destruction of Zelensky's rating by Poroshenko's allies
In this article, we examine how the policies of Viktor Yelensky and representatives of Petro Poroshenko have affected the government's attitude towards the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.
In the previous article dedicated to Viktor Yelensky, we noted several points indicating that this person believes he has the right to speak on behalf of the state and tries to create an impression of too-close relations with the President of Ukraine.
In this article, we discuss how the policies of the State Service of Ukraine on Ethnopolitics and Freedom of Conscience (DESS) have influenced the government's attitude towards the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.
We have mentioned that almost from the first day after his appointment, Yelensky pursued a course aimed at banning the UOC. The language he used when communicating with representatives of our Church was one of ultimatums and threats rather than dialogue. Overall, it can be said that Yelensky’s tenure as the head of DESS was marked by a series of decisions that undoubtedly harmed the state. His policies can be characterized as aimed at dividing Ukrainian society and exacerbating existing tensions between different religious communities rather than fostering mutual understanding.
One of the main criticisms of Yelensky’s leadership is his evident favoritism towards one Christian confession in Ukraine to the detriment of another. His sympathies to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) were manifested in various ways: from increasing pressure on the UOC and constant checks of its "activities" to legislative initiatives that many foreign politicians and human rights defenders consider undemocratic.
Primarily, this concerns Bill 8371 (now Law No 3894), in the development of which Yelensky's department was actively involved. His support for the OCU and constant focus on banning the UOC led to an increase in acts of violence and vandalism against UOC believers. It should be understood that Yelensky’s actions harm not only himself or his department but primarily the Ukrainian government as a whole, which alienates a significant part of the population that identifies themselves with the UOC. All of this makes Yelensky’s policies especially harmful and destructive.
Yelensky and Olena Bohdan
To fully understand the impact of Yelensky’s leadership, it is useful to compare his work with that of his predecessor, Olena Bohdan, who held the position of DESS head before Yelensky and, by common opinion, adhered to a more balanced and cautious approach to religious issues in Ukraine. She understood that Ukraine needed interfaith dialogue, where the state should remain a neutral arbitrator in religious matters.
For example, when the lawlessness against the UOC began with the onset of the war, Bohdan said things that were very disliked by OCU representatives, in particular:
- only church, not territorial, communities could vote on "transitions";
- the UOC is not governed from Moscow;
- the UOC is the largest denomination in the country;
- after seizures, the OCU’s temples stand empty;
- the OCU has fewer than 50 monks in Kyiv and has no one to fill the Lavra;
- UOC ban would lead to destabilization in the country.
Even after her dismissal, Olena Bohdan continued to speak according to her conscience and professional honour. She said the following: the church situation is being used for electoral purposes; the state cannot regulate the canonical ties of the Church; the DESS's conclusions on the church-canonical ties of the UOC with the ROC are groundless and full of assumptions; the UOC leaving the Lavra will not strengthen national security.
It seems these are obvious things, and disputing them means not understanding the religious situation in Ukraine and engaging in ordinary populism. But Yelensky does not see it this way. For this reason, his department and he personally engage in pressure on the UOC. For example, he publishes demands for the UOC to withdraw from the ROC; asserts that he already has a plan to combat the UOC; claims that there are no privileged churches in Ukraine; lies that the authorities do not want to ban the UOC, but then says that those who oppose Bill 8371 are acknowledging ties with Moscow.
It should be noted that more than 50 deputies did not vote for BIll 8371 (29 against, 4 abstained, 24 did not vote at all). Are they all pro-Moscow?
Nevertheless, Yelensky's activities are exclusively destructive to the Ukrainian state. This is not only our view but also that of the State Bureau of Investigations, which has opened a criminal case against the leadership of the State Service of Ukraine on Ethnopolitics – Yelensky and his deputy Voinalovych.
In any case, during Olena Bohdan's tenure as DESS head, the Ukrainian government pursued a more balanced church policy, directing its efforts towards the unity of Ukrainian society rather than its division. For example, in April 2022, Speaker of the Rada Ruslan Stefanchuk said that "we have no right to adopt any law that divides Ukrainian society."
However, as soon as Yelensky took over DESS, the rhetoric changed instantly. If Bogdan's leadership was characterized by a desire for religious peace and state neutrality in church matters, Yelensky’s tenure as DESS head was marked by increased state interference in religious affairs. For this reason, we believe that this person has had a significant impact on Zelensky's stance on this issue.
Influence on President Zelensky: change in attitude to the UOC
Viktor Yelensky's influence on President Zelensky’s religious policy is especially evident in the change in his stance towards the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. Initially, Zelensky had a neutral position on religious issues, emphasizing the importance of religious freedom and avoiding involvement in disputes between the UOC and the OCU. However, starting in the autumn of 2022 (precisely when V. Zelensky was introduced to V. Yelensky), his position changed, becoming initially more critical of the UOC and then outright intolerant.
This transformation in Zelensky’s views can be traced almost day by day. When Yelensky began to shape the narrative around the UOC, emphasizing its alleged ties with Russia and presenting it as a threat to national security, the rhetoric of the Ukrainian President also began to change.
For example, in his early public statements, Zelensky emphasized the importance of unity among all religious groups and refrained from commenting on the internal affairs of the Church.
Initially, the President took a “hands-off” approach to the Church, advocating that all disputes be resolved as much as possible within the framework of the law and without state interference. It even reached the point where Epifaniy complained that the state at the regional administration level had "no desire to carry out re-registration" of communities that "voiced a desire" to join his structure. In other words, Zelensky’s government refused to support the seizure of UOC churches.
Moreover, the President himself repeatedly expressed hope that religious leaders would contribute to the unity of Ukraine and Ukrainian society and even initiated a film featuring everyone except Dumenko, who refused to participate in the project. In other words, at the beginning of his presidency, as well as at the beginning of the war, Zelensky tried to be a president of a state that does not interfere in church affairs. However, after interacting with Yelensky, by mid-2022, Zelensky’s tone noticeably changed. He began to talk about the need for "spiritual independence", expressed concern about the UOC’s "ties" with the aggressor state, and ultimately initiated government measures that outlawed the Church.
The question of how Yelensky managed to influence the President’s position is left aside. But the question of why he needs this is worth answering.
Yelensky, the OCU and Poroshenko
Let’s recall that Yelensky was a deputy from the block of Volodymyr Hroysman – a friend, an ally and a closest assistant to Petro Poroshenko. It was during this time that Yelensky became close to Dumenko and the OCU in general. Epifaniy and his organisation were directly involved in the election campaign of former Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko. Moreover, Dumenko and the OCU clearly associated themselves as part of Poroshenko’s team.
For example, Epifaniy went with Poroshenko on "Tomos tours" (as journalists called the campaign trips around Ukrainian cities), where he practically performed the functions of a campaigner for Poroshenko as a presidential candidate.
Dumenko claimed that he saw “only President Poroshenko” at the head of the country. He stated that Poroshenko’s name is on par with St. Vladimir, the Baptizer of Rus. He asserted that Poroshenko is a “model leader” for him. In short, Serhiy Dumenko, along with the OCU, was part of Petro Poroshenko’s political team and was prepared for only one outcome – the victory of his patron. Viktor Yelensky has been (and remains?) part of this team, running in the Groysman party lists as number 10.
Considering all of the above, it becomes clear why Yelensky is striving to ban the UOC. After all, this will destroy the unity of Ukrainian society, undermine trust in the government and damage Ukraine's reputation abroad, which in turn will facilitate the return to power of his old colleague and patron, Petro Poroshenko.
It is only strange why the President’s Office does not see such obvious things.
