The arrest of Fr Mykolay Danylevych, or Who does the SBU work for?

15 April 14:48
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Mykolay Danylevych's arrest: why, what for and who benefits? Photo: UOJ Mykolay Danylevych's arrest: why, what for and who benefits? Photo: UOJ

On 12 April 2024, SBU officers conducted searches at the deputy head of the OCU's Department for External Church Relations, Fr Mykolay Danylevych.

As a result of the search, Fr Mykolay was accused of justifying the aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, as well as promoting "pro-Russian narratives". The evidence of the "illegal activities" of the deputy head of the "Сhurch's Foreign Ministry" was his student library card and a certificate of completion of English language courses at the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. SBU representatives stated that the priest faces up to 5 years in prison with confiscation of property.

For everyone who knows Fr Mykolay or at least has heard his statements about the war between Russia and Ukraine, all the charges brought by the Security Services came as a shock. How could the man who wrote in the first minutes after the start of the invasion: "Putin treacherously attacked Ukraine, I bless you for the defence of the Motherland", and whose brother has been fighting on the front line since the beginning of the war, somehow justify this aggression? We all understand and are sure that the SBU also realises that such a thing simply could not have happened. So, what is going on?

What is Danylevych "guilty" of?

A few words about the "arguments" of the prosecution. Obviously, all the "evidence of guilt" presented against Father Nikolai is, as they say, "a zilch". Student IDs, the dates of which were carefully blirred, although they are crucial in this case, cannot serve as "evidence" of working for the occupying state. Simply because probably half of Ukrainian politicians and military personnel have such documents. For example, the current Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Syrsky, graduated from the Moscow Higher Military Command School.

We can also remember Poturaev, who from 1996 to 1997 was the director of the Advertising and PR Department at the UESU corporation owned by Yulia Tymoshenko and was involved in transporting gas from Russia to Ukraine. And that's just off the top of my head.

We're not even talking about the dates because Fr Mykolay studied in Moscow in 2007 when there was no talk of a possible military confrontation with Russia. And if this is incriminated in his guilt, it is worth remembering what relations with the aggressor state our politicians had during this period, for example, from 2007 to 2014: the current president was actively earning money in Russia, his team was making and showing films for the Russian audience, many deputies and politicians had legal business in Russia, paid taxes, bought real estate, maintained relations with Russian politicians. And many in Ukraine turned a blind eye to this – there was no war.

Everything changed (for many) after 2014. But even then, after the start of the war in the Donbass, some modern politicians continued their business on the territory of the aggressor state, and it was only after 24 February 2022 that they realized that it was not possible to do so. So why are these politicians not being held accountable? Why aren't they being charged with studying at Russian educational institutions, doing business in Russia or having other relationships with this state? And if they are not brought to justice, then why did SBU officers come to Fr Mykolay Danylevych?

We are sure that this was done for one reason only – a political order. For the same reason, law enforcers arrested our fellow journalists, and the same reason explains the authorities’ persecution of the Church. But why Danylevych? Let's try to explain.

The UOC and Europe

Accusing this person of supporting the aggressor state can only come from someone with an unlimited imagination. Let's remember that it was precisely Archpriest Mykolay Danylevych who was among the group of UOC priests who personally went to Mariupol to seek the release of the "Azov" members. We believe that Fr Mykolay also stood behind Metropolitan Onuphry's appeal to the Russian leadership to release captured Ukrainian soldiers. This is simply explained – his brother fights in the "Azov" ranks. Therefore, any accusations against the deputy head of the UOC DECR is a flight of sick fantasy of an SBU investigator. But he went along with it, of course, following orders.

The question is why didn't the authorities, knowing that their charges against Fr Mykolay would be perceived by society as utter nonsense, stop? Because the hierarch is seriously bothering someone. The question is who?

Law enforcers accused the priest of promoting "pro-Russian narratives" under the guise of UOC parishes in Europe. So, this can be considered the main reason for the incredible frenzy towards Danylevych. And it's clear that the security forces couldn't care less about what the UOC opens in Europe. But it does matter to those directly affected by the Church's activities abroad. And here we have three immediate versions, each of which is directly related to UOC parishes abroad.

So, since the beginning of the war, our Church, in fulfilment of the decisions of the Local Council in Feofania of 27 May 2022, has established an entire vicariate abroad. At the moment, the UOC in Europe and the world has a foreign bishop, over a hundred of its parishes, where dozens of priests serve, and thousands of parishioners. Moreover, it continues to grow.

This is understandable – there are many Ukrainians abroad, and they want to pray in the Church that has nothing to do with neither the Dumenko structure nor the Phanar, nor the ROC, which could be the main beneficiaries of the pressure on Fr Mykolay Danylevych.

The UOC, the ROC and Europe

Let us recall that the first to express concern about the emergence of UOC parishes in Europe were representatives of the ROC. Metropolitan Mark of Berlin stated back in September 2022 that he "does not welcome" the creation of "parallel structures" in Europe, and noted that UOC priests organising parishes in EU countries "seek advice from everyone but us".

Later, Priest Konstantin Schmidt (ROC) and Fr Michael Bondar (ROCOR) accused the UOC of schism – all because of setting up parishes in Europe. Their statement was responded to not only in our Church, but in ROCOR itself, which said it does not seek "monopoly ownership of the diaspora".

Indeed, ROCOR, although formally within the structure of the Moscow Patriarchate, has different views on Russia's war against Ukraine, and at the same time has repeatedly spoken out against the persecution of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church by the Ukrainian authorities.

ROC hierarchs, in turn, have a completely different view of Ukrainian parishes abroad. For example, Kirill Govorun said, "The Russian exarch to Western Europe has a similar dialogue with Catholics on the ground: either you continue the dialogue with us, or you support the UOC." According to Govorun, sometimes Catholics stop their support. "For example, there was a case in Verona in Italy, where there was an attempt to create a parish of the UOC, and Catholics first helped with a temple for services and then stopped under the pressure of arguments from the Russian exarch," Govorun said, adding that "Putin is not interested in supporting the UOC as such. He is interested in sowing discord between Ukrainian Сhurches, creating problems for both the UOC and the OCU, and even more so – for them to see the problem not in Putin but in each other."

From this perspective, accusing Ukrainian parishes of "promoting pro-Russian narratives" is foolish. Russia and the ROC do not benefit from the presence of the UOC abroad. And here we can assume that the arrest of Fr Mykolay Danylevych, like the completely wild searches by SBU representatives in the Chernivtsi Eparchy (Metropolitan Meletiy, the head of the UOC DECR) is clearly beneficial to the ROC.

The majority of Ukrainian parishes in Europe were opened at the initiative and with the personal participation of Danylevych, which means that his "neutralization" will significantly slow down the development of the Western European vicariate of the UOC, if not halt it altogether.

The UOC, the Phanar and Europe

But even more than the collapse of our Church's foreign parishes, the Patriarchate of Constantinople and the OCU benefit. The point is that the Phanar precisely promotes the idea of absolute monopoly regarding the diaspora. In other words, since the 1920s, hierarchs and theologians of the Patriarchate of Constantinople have asserted that only their Church can oversee Orthodox believers in countries where there is no Local Church.

From this perspective, Orthodox Christians in, for example, Germany or Italy are automatically under the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of Constantinople. It is worth noting that this position unusual and unacceptable for Orthodoxy was spelt out by the Phanar in the Tomos of the OCU, which prohibited the Dumenko structure from creating its parishes outside of Ukraine.

At the same time, almost all autocephalous Churches challenge the "monopoly on the diaspora" by opening their parishes regardless of the Phanar.

Moreover, many experts consider the presence of foreign parishes as one of the signs of autocephaly. By the way, based on this, the majority of UOC-KP parishes abroad refused to join the newly created OCU, rightly believing that the ban on existence in other countries deprives it of independence. Moreover, within the OCU itself, there are increasing voices that the text of the Tomos needs to be amended to allow Epifaniy to "work" abroad.

At the same time, the Patriarchate of Constantinople, while declaring unwavering support for Ukraine, is not in a hurry to open Ukrainian parishes in Europe, as noted in an interview by Govorun. He said that "the reality is that the Patriarchate of Constantinople, which should take care of Ukrainian refugees abroad, rarely does so. There is the personal position of Patriarch Bartholomew, absolutely in favour of providing maximum assistance to Ukrainian refugees. But on the ground, in the dioceses, the majority do not have such enthusiasm. Constantinople's bishops abroad have their concerns and problems. Against the backdrop of the inert position of Constantinople and Moscow's hostile position, two Ukrainian Churches have actually entered into competition with each other."

And it is clear that at the moment, this "competition" is won by the UOC, which actively opens its parishes abroad.

The UOC, the OCU and Europe

The conclusion is evident: the OCU can be called the main beneficiary of the persecution of Archpriest Mykolay Danylevych. In many ways, the SBU employees are currently not engaged in their direct duties of identifying illegal activities by real criminals but rather in eliminating Dumenko’s rivals, both inside and outside Ukraine.

We have no other rational explanations for what is happening to the DECR UOC. Except, perhaps, as an option, someone among the law enforcement officers, by initiating persecution against true patriots of Ukraine, is trying to "set up" the country's authorities.

In any case, this situation, no matter how wild and absurd it may be in reality, is unlikely to help Epifaniy increase his influence in Europe. The European Union is not Ukraine, and there are laws in force there, which means that it will not be possible to simply come and take over a temple of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and expel the believers.

Nor will it work to create any kind of "competition" for our Church in missionary terms. Because if there is a choice between the UOC and the OCU, then in most cases, the UOC is opted for. The evidence is our full temples, both in Ukraine and Europe.

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