Autonomy of the UOC and removal of the Donetsk Metropolitan

Metropolitan Ilarion of Donetsk. Photo: UOJ

On October 24, 2024, the Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church decided to release Metropolitan Ilarion from the see of the Donetsk diocese and retire him. This decision was made unilaterally, without consultation with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, despite the fact that the UOC is recognized as a self-governing Church by the Moscow Patriarchate, in spirit and in letter. In this article, we will address the canonical and ethical aspects of this decision, as well as its implications for the UOC and the entire Orthodox world.

What does the Charter of Patriarch Alexy II state?

In 1990, Patriarch Alexy II issued a Tomos, which recognized the UOC as an autonomous and self-governing Church within the ROC. This document clearly stipulates that the UOC is entirely independent in managing its internal affairs, meaning it appoints and dismisses bishops and establishes or abolishes dioceses independently.

The Donetsk Eparchy, located in eastern Ukraine, had been under the leadership of Metropolitan Ilarion since 1996. He made tremendous contributions to the diocese (for instance, when he began his service in Donetsk, there were a dozen churches, but now there are more than a hundred).

Amid the ongoing conflict in Donbas since 2014, Metropolitan Ilarion has consistently taken a peacekeeping stance, striving to ease the suffering of his flock affected by the never-ending hostilities. For this reason, he is seen by many in Donbas as a moral and spiritual authority.

In this light, the decision of the ROC Synod to remove him without following (even formally) the usual procedures outlined in the ROC’s own statutes is seen as an extremely problematic move.

The ROC’s stance on the autonomy of the UOC

According to the ROC’s statutes, the UOC is recognized as a self-governing church with the right to independently manage its internal affairs. This statute explicitly states that matters such as the appointment or dismissal of bishops fall under the jurisdiction of the UOC itself.

Recognition of self-governing status is not merely a formality but also a commitment to respect the autonomy of the UOC and its right to independently address issues related to the needs and challenges of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and its faithful.

Furthermore, the granting of autonomous status to the UOC entails respect for its own Statute, which clearly states that decisions concerning the appointment or removal of bishops must be made by the UOC Synod or the Assembly of Bishops of the UOC.

However, in the case of Metropolitan Ilarion, the ROC Synod made a unilateral decision, which:

  1. Indicates a lack of respect for the UOC;
  2. Demonstrates the ROC leadership’s inability to adhere to its own promises and agreements;
  3. Constitutes a significant overreach of canonical authority.

Canonical violations in the case of Metropolitan Ilarion

Canonical law has always emphasized the importance of respecting jurisdictional boundaries among Orthodox Churches. This principle is meant to help preserve unity and mutual respect among various Orthodox jurisdictions. This very principle was invoked by the Moscow Patriarchate in 2018 – when Patriarch Bartholomew issued the Tomos for the OCU.

The Eighth Canon of the Third Ecumenical Council explicitly forbids any bishop from interfering in the jurisdiction of another bishop, as follows: “The same rule shall be observed in the other dioceses and provinces everywhere, so that none of the God beloved Bishops shall assume control of any province which has not heretofore, from the very beginning, been under his own hand or that of his predecessors.”

Similarly, the Second Canon of the Second Ecumenical Council emphasizes the need to respect jurisdictional boundaries, warning against any attempts by one Church to assume control over another’s territory: “The bishops are not to go beyond their dioceses to churches lying outside of their bounds, nor bring confusion on the churches; but let the Bishop of Alexandria, according to the canons, alone administer the affairs of Egypt; and let the bishops of the East manage the East alone, the privileges of the Church in Antioch, which are mentioned in the canons of Nicaea.”

From these two canons (and many others), it is evident that the Holy Synod of the ROC had no right to intrude upon the canonical territory of the UOC and remove a hierarch from the Donetsk see who belongs to the UOC.

By intervening in the UOC’s internal affairs without consultation or consent, the ROC not only disregarded the autonomous status of the UOC but also violated the very rules it criticized the Phanar for breaching.

It is worth noting that violations of the canons threaten not only the unity of the Orthodox world but also undermine the faithful’s trust in the actions of the Church leadership. The example of the Donetsk Metropolitan unfortunately illustrates that the ROC may be willing to sacrifice canonical principles to assert its influence, a move that is undoubtedly affecting its relations with other Orthodox Churches.

The removal of Metropolitan Lazar of Crimea: What's in common?

The situation in the Donetsk diocese contrasts sharply with the ROC's approach to the Crimean diocese in 2022. In the case of Crimea, the ROC at least formally adhered to established protocol by accepting the "request" of the Crimean diocese to come under the direct authority of Patriarch Kirill.

This request was based on a decision by the Synod of the UOC, which “granted diocesan bishops the right to independently make decisions on certain diocesan matters” (though the question of changing jurisdiction is hardly within the scope of diocesan matters). The ROC then formalized this transition by recognizing the Crimean diocese under the personal administration of Patriarch Kirill. Thus, though with reservations and formality, the ROC at least attempted to create the appearance of adhering to canonical law and the UOC Statute in the case of Crimea.

In Donetsk, however, it was different: the Donetsk diocese did not seek to come under the personal administration of Patriarch Kirill or the ROC in general. No such request was made. The ROC acted unilaterally, intervening in the administration of the diocese without consulting the UOC.

Naturally, this decision raises questions about the ROC’s motivations, as it is evident that the removal of Metropolitan Ilarion is driven not only by ecclesiastical but also by external political considerations. Until recently, Metropolitan Ilarion commemorated His Beatitude Metropolitan Onuphry, expressed no desire to come under the omophorion of the Moscow Patriarch, and repeatedly stated his intention to remain within the UOC. Therefore, he was simply removed – without even an attempt to give this process the appearance of legality.

Ethical aspects of the ROC’s decision

Naturally, beyond canonical and procedural matters, the ROC’s actions also raise ethical questions. At the time of the decision to retire him, Metropolitan Ilarion was undergoing treatment in Germany and, according to our information, learned about the ROC Synod’s decision from the media.

Such treatment of a person who spent nearly 30 years leading the Donetsk diocese contradicts even basic norms of secular society, let alone Christian principles.

This decision by the ROC implies that institutional power takes precedence over such matters as pastoral care for individuals. It also undermines a principle that ROC representatives have preached for years: that the Church is independent of political borders, political situations, or the political moment. Due to these principles, the faithful of the UOC have suffered for many years, faced persecution, and even hostility in Ukrainian society. But in the case of Metropolitan Ilarion, it has become evident that for the ROC itself, these principles hold little significance. This inevitably calls into question the moral foundations upon which the ROC asserts its positions.

We simply want to remind the leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church that ethical responsibilities go beyond adherence to procedures (which, in this case, were also absent). The Church is not merely an administrative machine where decisions are made without regard for individual people. To act as they did with Metropolitan Ilarion is to dismiss virtues such as respect, care, and compassion, especially toward those in vulnerable situations.

Implications for the Orthodox Church and ecclesiastical unity

The ROC’s decision to interfere in the internal affairs of the UOC marks a significant shift in the relationship between the UOC and the ROC. This step may indicate that the autonomy of the UOC is of little importance to the ROC, something that can be disregarded. Naturally, this position only fosters further polarization between the two Churches, provoking the UOC leadership to take measures that the ROC will later label “uncanonical”.

This decision could also affect how the ROC is perceived by other Orthodox Churches. If the ROC is willing to bypass canonical norms to assert control over an autonomous Church, it not only weakens its own arguments in disputes with the Ecumenical Patriarchate, but also hands a strategic advantage to the Ecumenical Patriarchate, which could now leverage this precedent to demonstrate that the ROC itself violates the very rules it references.

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