Battle of Statutes: how much UOC depends on ROC

The Bishops’ Council is over, corrections to the ROC’s Statute are made, press-conferences of the UOC officials conducted, comments and think pieces written. Yet the only issue is what an actual dependence of the UOC on Moscow is.

After the Council of Bishops, the enemies of the Church hastened to pour on Her another portion of accusations that the ROC narrowed the independent authority of the UOC. This is not true, although there is one "but". The fact is that in one paragraph texts of the Statutes of the UOC and the ROC really contradict each other. What is the essence of this contradiction and what arises from this?

In the previous version of the Statute of the Russian Orthodox Church, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church was mentioned in Chapter XI "Self-governing Churches". However, it was not listed among self-governing Churches. Instead, it was defined: "The Ukrainian Orthodox Church is self-governing with the rights of broad autonomy. In its life and work it is guided by Tomos of the Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia of 1990 and the Statute of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, which is confirmed by its Primate and approved by the Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia."

That is, rather an unusual status was designated – "self-governing with the rights of broad autonomy", but it was not said how this status is to be manifested. The semantic content of the status of "self-governing Church" is (Chapter XI) is given, so is the status of "autonomous church" (Chapter X). But what exactly is the status of the UOC? This point has spawned rumors and given the ground to severely criticize the UOC, accusing it of being the structure of the "aggressor state" in Ukraine.

The hierarchy of the UOC, responding to these accusations, spoke of the independence of the UOC absolutely in all matters, except the dogma, the moral and canonical system of the Church. At the same time they referred to such documents as "The Decree of the Bishops' Council of the Russian Orthodox Church of 1990" On the Ukrainian Orthodox Church ", the Charter of the Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia of 1990 and the Charter of the UOC.

In their turn, the enemies of the Church immediately rolled over on the Charter of the ROC and said that it does not define the UOC as an independent structure. To take away from enemies this argument, and also to confirm the independence and self-governance of the UOC at the level of the main legal document of the ROC, Metropolitan Onufry initiated to fill in the status of the UOC as "self-governing with the rights of broad autonomy" with specific provisions. In other words, to enshrine what this status is expressed in.

It should be noted that this initiative was announced by the Primate of the UOC, and could not therefore involve that the rights of the UOC would be narrowed or diminished.

The Council of Bishops supported this initiative, and separate Chapter X "The Ukrainian Orthodox Church" was introduced into the Charter of the Russian Orthodox Church. The first paragraph defines the status of the UOC as "self-governing with the rights of broad autonomy". The second paragraph recognizes its "independence in its management". The third lists the documents, regulating its activities. They are as follows:
On the basis of these documents, it is possible to distinguish between which issues fall within the competence of the UOC, and which ones belong to the entire ROC.

Absolutely independently the UOC solves the following issues:

1. Staffing. The election of all clergy, beginning from subdeacons and ending with the Primate of the UOC. There are basically no legal instruments via which Moscow could influence the decision of the personnel issues within the UOC. The blessing of the UOC Primate by the Moscow Patriarch will be discussed below.

2. Financial. All issues relating to financing parishes, monasteries, eparchies and the metropolitanate of the UOC are settled in Ukraine. Fables about the fact that after every Sunday service suitcases of money, collected from simple-minded Ukrainian parishioners are dispatched to Russia, are not confirmed by a single fact, although they have been in the air for several decades.

3. Economic. All candle factories, sewing workshops, monastic agricultural enterprises, etc. are managed at the level of monasteries, eparchies or by the Administrative-Economic Department of the UOC, accountable to the Synod of the UOC.

4. Property. Property rights, as well as other property rights to all temple buildings and other movable and immovable church property, belong exclusively to the UOC. This is clearly stated in the letter of Patriarch Aleksy to the Minister of Justice of Ukraine V. Onopenko.



5. Administrative. Formation and abolition of eparchies, determination of their borders, creation of metropolitan districts if necessary, creation and abolition of synodal departments, determination of their powers, etc. fall within the competence of the governing bodies of the UOC.

6. External relations. In the UOC there is a Department of External Church Relations, which deals with communication with the Local Orthodox Churches, as well as with other states and international organizations. The current pressure on the UOC both from the state and from the radical nationalists has stepped up this direction. There has been established a Representation of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church to European International Organizations, and its head Victor (Kotsaba) was ordained to the rank of bishop. Of course, at certain times the external relations of the UOC presuppose some coordination with the Moscow Patriarchate. For example, the meeting of the Primate of the UOC with the Pope cannot take place without such coordination. But there are no legal instruments for the influence of the Moscow Patriarchate on the external activities of the UOC. The corresponding department is accountable only to the governing bodies of the UOC.

7. Litigation. "Within the Ukrainian Orthodox Church operates its own highest ecclesiastical and judicial instance. At the same time, the court of the Council of Bishops is a church court of supreme jurisdiction for the Ukrainian Orthodox Church" (Para.12., Chapter X of the Statute of the Russian Orthodox Church). Do not rush to the conclusion that the UOC is not independent in judicial matters. How to understand the provision on this "highest judicial authority" will be discussed below.

If all these issues – personnel, financial, economic, property, judicial and external relations – relate to the independent competence of the UOC, then it's time to ask: in what plane is the UOC subordinated to the ROC?

It is subordinated in the following:

1. The doctrine. The UOC cannot independently state or explain Orthodox doctrinal truths. Precedents when a separate bishop or even a priest writes his "Orthodox catechism" are found, but these works remain the "catechism" of a particular priest or bishop. Now the ROC is developing a project of the Catechism of the Russian Orthodox Church. The adoption of such a doctrinal document at the level of a separate Local Church is possible, and such historical precedents have already been made. But its adoption at the level of a "self-governing Church with the rights of broad autonomy" is inappropriate. If the Catechism of the ROC is adopted, it will be mandatory for the UOC.

2. Moral teaching. What is sin and what is not. What in the life of an Orthodox Christian can be tolerated within the framework of ecclesiastical dispensation, and what is absolutely unacceptable. These and other issues are solved by the entire ROC and are binding for the faithful children of the UOC. An example is the document "Foundations of the Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church", adopted by the Bishops' Council in 2000. Relationships with politics, the state (not particular, but in general), labour, property, etc. Issues of personal, family and public morality, the problems of bioethics and so on. All this cannot be formulated at the level of the UOC. In general, one can express regret that such a document has not been adopted at the level of World Orthodoxy. Maybe, it will happen in the future. So far, no Local Church, except for the ROC, has been able to create such a document, which requires enormous scientific and theological efforts of many people. It is known that in the church practice of other Local Churches there is a voluntary reception (borrowing) of the whole document, as well as its separate provisions.

3. Canonical issues. This category of authority continues the previous one. An example is the document "On the Canonical Aspects of Church Marriage". It hardly makes sense to resolve such issues at the level of the UOC. Do we have our own "independent" view of how many times it is possible to get married or for what reasons to get divorced? Unless in Section V "Recognition of a church marriage having lost its canonical power", additional reasons for divorce can be introduced. Sub-paragraph "a) the fall of one of the spouses out of Orthodoxy" may be followed by sub-paragraph "b) the denial of the" Revolution of Dignity ". It is a joke!

That is, the UOC is subordinated to the Moscow Patriarchate on issues that are not connected with the so-called external existence of the Church. There is something else, and this is what the enemies of the Church emphasize:
Do not rush to state that by this the UOC shows its dependence on Moscow. The fact is that in the language, so to speak, of secular jurisprudence, all this refers to the representative powers that, for example, the monarch has in the constitutional republics. For example, the Queen of Great Britain is the head of such states as Canada, Australia, New Zealand - a total of 16 states. But no one says that these countries are not sovereign and independent.

Let's wonder: what will happen if the Patriarch does not bless the newly elected Primate of the UOC or approve its Statute, what will happen if a priest in a remote village does not remember the Patriarch during the divine service? Neither the Statute of the ROC, nor the Statute of the ROC, nor other documents give any answer to this question. This means that the situation in this case will leave the legal plane and go to another: political, disciplinary, moral, spiritual, etc. This all is similar to the following questions: what will happen if the Primates of Local Churches do not recognize the election of the Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church? There is no legal answer.

It is possible to understand the representative nature of the powers, for example, that the Patriarch blesses the newly elected Primate of the UOC, by comparing this with the procedure for electing the Primate of the Self-Governing Church.

At the first stage, the Patriarch and the Synod of the ROC approve candidates for the Primate of the Self-Governing Church. Then the Council of Bishops of this Church elects the Primate from them. Further, the Patriarch approves the newly elected one, and only after this the new Primate takes office. This is an example of really managerial, rather than representative powers.

Thus, to conclude from the above-mentioned powers of the Patriarch in relation to the UOC that the UOC is not independent is absolutely wrong.

Somewhat differently, we should consider the provisions of the Statute of the ROC that the highest judicial instance for the UOC is the Bishops' Council of the ROC, and that the decisions of the Local and Bishops' Councils of the ROC are mandatory for the Ukrainian Church.

The Local and Bishops' Council of the Russian Orthodox Church can take decisions with respect to the UOC only on those issues that are not attributed to the exclusive competence of the UOC by the statutory documents. As we have already specified, such issues are not many, and they belong to a strictly religious sphere. This is dogmatism, morality and the canonical system.

This provision of the Statute, as well as the fact that the highest judicial instance is the Bishops' Council of the ROC, can be compared with the so-called "sleeping" powers of the same British Queen. That is, they are designed for some extreme cases that may arise in the future. Some absolutely unusual circumstances, in which you may need to take some emergency actions. For example, in Ukraine a heresiarch alike Aria or Macedonia, or the second "Mikhail Denisenko" (God forbid, of course) will arise. This does not mean that the ROC will enjoy these powers in everyday life. The same British Queen can dismiss the British Prime Minister, but last time it was in 1834. And again, such cases, as a rule, go beyond the scope of jurisprudence and acquire a different dimension: political, moral or spiritual.

Thus, it is possible to repeat what was said by many officials both in the UOC and in the ROC: the changes in the ROC Statute do not create any new legal reality; they fix and express textually the relationship and the status of the UOC, which exists and according to which the UOC has already been living not one decade.

BUT! Unfortunately, in one point the Statutes of the UOC and the ROC contradict each other. And this is a fact. We are talking about which body approves the decision of the Synod of the UOC on the formation and abolition of eparchies, as well as the determination of their borders. According to the Statute of the UOC, it is the Council of Bishops of the UOC.



By the Statute of the ROC – the Bishops' Council of the ROC.



Firstly, in all paragraphs of Chapter X: "The Ukrainian Orthodox Church" the term "Bishops' Council" is used in the meaning "Bishops' Council of the ROC" Secondly, there is no such body at all in the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, there is the Council of Bishops instead. These are two different terms, although they essentially mean the same thing.

The practice of applying this norm also indicates that the Bishops’ Council of the Russian Orthodox Church has always approved decisions on the formation of Ukrainian eparchies. To make sure of this, it is enough to look through the documents of the Bishops' Councils of the Russian Orthodox Church over the past years, for example, dated 2013:



Thus, nothing new has been introduced in the existing UOC-ROC relationship. And there is no reason to talk about narrowing or reducing the rights of the UOC.

As for the very conflict between the Statutes of the UOC and the ROC, we can say the following.

First, from a purely legal point of view, in the matter of approving the formation of eparchies, preference should be given to the Statute of the UOC. Section 1 of Ch. X says that the UOC in its life and activity is guided by the Resolution of the Bishops' Council of the ROC, the Diploma of the Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia of 1990, and the Statute of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. But it is not said that it is guided by the Statute of the Russian Orthodox Church.

Secondly, so far, there has not been a single precedent when the Bishops' Council of the ROC did not approve the decision of the Synod of the UOC concerning eparchies. And it is almost impossible to imagine in what case this could happen. Thus, this can also be attributed to representative, rather than managerial powers.

Thirdly, in the Church, unlike the state, many issues are resolved not according to legal formulations, but according to age-old traditions. Thus, eparchies are formed with the blessing of the hierarchy of the Local Church.

Therefore, to say that in the issue of the formation of the eparchies the UOC is dependent and subordinated to the ROC is wrong.

I would like to conclude with the words of Bishop Victor (Kotsaba), said in the interview with the "First Cossack" channel. Regarding the accusations that the UOC is ruled from Moscow, Vladyka said:

"I invite my opponents to my office, and you will watch a day, two days, as long as you need, how the Ukrainian Orthodox Church is ruled. And you will see that there is not even close contact, any kind of coordination with Moscow. The Church has its Primate, its Synod, it has its own administration, its own life, its being. And since 1990, it has been carrying out its mission in Ukraine."

Read also

Autonomy of the UOC and removal of the Donetsk Metropolitan

On October 24, 2024, the ROC Synod decided to release Metropolitan Ilarion from the see of the Donetsk Eparchy and retire him. What does this decision mean for the UOC?

What secrets about the UOJ did the SBU uncover through its agent?

Recently, UOJ staff members Andriy Ovcharenko, Valeriy Stupnytskyi, and Volodymyr Bobecko, as well as priest Serhiy Chertylin, received indictments on charges of treason.

Three mysterious synods: What was decided in relation to the UOC?

This week, sessions of three synods of different Orthodox Churches were held. What did they decide regarding the existence of the Church in Ukraine?

Cherkasy Cathedral seized, what's next?

On 17 October 2024, supporters of the OCU seized the Cathedral in Cherkasy. How can events unfold, and what could this mean for the Church?

Faith against violence: Chronicle of the UOC cathedral seizure in Cherkasy

On 17 October 2024, OCU followers seized the UOC cathedral in Cherkasy. How did it happen, and what conclusions can we draw from this event?

The arson of a UOC temple, or Once again about “free transitions” to OCU

In late September, supporters of the OCU burnt down a UOC church in Volyn. How is this arson related to the myth of “free transitions” from the UOC to the OCU?